Radical Right-wing Populism in Denmark and Sweden: Explaining Party System Change and Stability

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This paper aims to present possible explanations as to why radical right-wing populist parties have been highly successful in Denmark but have largely failed in Sweden. It shows that Denmark and Sweden shared several important opportunity structures, in particular related to anti-immigrant sentiments among the electorates and feelings of disenchantment toward the political institutions, but also that the two countries diverged in some important ways: First, while the socioeconomic cleavage dimension lost much of its importance in Danish politics, it was still highly salient in Swedish politics. Secondly and related, the issue of immigration has been much more politicized in Denmark than in Sweden. While immigration has dominated the political agenda in Danish politics during the last decade, in Sweden the socioeconomic dimension has taken center stage.

Introduction

During the past two decades, radical right-wing populist (RRP) parties have reemerged as an electoral force in Western Europe, as well as in other stable democracies such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Since the early 1980s parties such as the French Front National, the Belgian Vlaams Blok, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), and the Danish People’s Party, among several others, have established themselves in their respective party systems, sometimes with vote shares exceeding 20 percent. The new family of radical right-wing parties shares a fundamental core of ethno-nationalist xenophobia (based on the so-called ethno-pluralist doctrine) and anti-political establishment populism.

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The new radical right gives priority to sociocultural issues, in particular to issues related to national identity, and its central political program can be understood as “a response to the erosion of the system of ‘ethno-national dominance,’ which characterized much of the history of modern nation states.” Ethno-pluralism is an ideology that is in line with right-wing ideas going back to Herder and was in modern times elaborated by the French Nouvelle Droite. Departing from the left’s notion of difference—on which the doctrine of multiculturalism is largely based—the notion of ethno-pluralism states that, to preserve the unique national characters of different peoples, they have to be kept separated. Mixing of different ethnicities only leads to cultural extinction. This ideological core is embedded in a general sociocultural conservatism, stressing themes like law and order and traditional family values.

The emergence of the new radical right-wing populist parties was preceded by the foundation of right-wing populist parties in Denmark and Norway in the early 1970s. These parties mobilized primarily against bureaucracy and a tax burden that in their opinion had escalated out of proportion, but were not ethno-nationalist. Neither did they mobilize against immigration until the 1980s. In Denmark, the Progress Party emerged in the landslide election of 1973 with almost 16 percent of the vote. In Sweden, however, no similar party achieved such electoral success.

Although the Danish Progress Party since the mid-1980s adopted a rhetoric that approximates the discourse of RRP parties, often with a strong focus on anti-immigration themes, I would argue that Denmark did not get a pure RRP party until the formation of the Danish People’s Party in 1995. The Danish People’s Party was founded as a breakaway fraction of the Danish Progress Party. In the mid-1990s, a group led by Pia Kjærsgaard left the party and founded the Danish People’s Party. In their first election, in 1998, the party received 7.4 percent of the vote, and in 2001 their share of the vote increased to 12 percent, reaching 13.9 percent of the votes in 2007. After the 2001 legislative election, the Danish People’s Party was given a pivotal position and gained recognition as the support party for the newly formed Liberal-Conservative coalition government. In fact, the party has functioned as the government’s main coalition partner in day-to-day politics ever since. As a result Denmark has witnessed a dramatic change toward stricter immigration policies over the past years.

In Sweden, RRP parties have been relatively marginalized, with the exception of the 1991 election, when the newly formed New Democracy garnered 6.7 percent of the vote. However, since the collapse of New Democracy in 1994, no Swedish (radical) right-wing populist party has come close to winning a parliamentary seat. Sweden’s RRP parties are marginalized in a Western European context, although the Sweden Democrats, the country’s leading RRP party, have increased their support lately. For example, in the 2006 general election the party managed to increase its voter share from 1.4 percent to almost 3 percent and gained more than 250 seats on different local councils. Still, unlike many other Western European countries, including Denmark, the mainstream parties in Sweden have erected a cordon sanitaire against the Sweden Democrats, largely avoiding any kind of collaboration.
Denmark and Sweden share several important traits—such as welfare regimes, secularism, and a history of Social Democratic dominance—so the fact that radical right-wing populism has proved itself highly successful in Denmark but largely failed in Sweden is counterintuitive. It is the aim of this paper to present possible explanations for the evolution of RRP parties in these two countries. Due to length concerns, I will focus primarily on the differences between Denmark and Sweden that in earlier research were identified as most pertinent to such an explanation. First, I will discuss realignment and dealignment processes. In both countries the number of floating voters, open for mobilization efforts by new party contenders, has increased during the past decades. However, whereas a realignment process has taken place in Danish politics, in which the sociocultural cleavage dimension has gained prominence, Swedish politics are still largely dominated by socioeconomic issues. This has worked as a shield against mobilization attempts by RRP parties in Sweden. Relatedly, whereas the immigration issue is highly politicized in Denmark, and has dominated the political agenda the past decade, the immigration issue is a relatively marginal topic in Sweden. This also has worked against the emergence of an electorally strong RRP party in Swedish politics.

**Dealignment and Realignment Processes**

Dealignment and realignment processes provide a favorable political opportunity structure for emerging RRP parties. Several cleavage dimensions always exist simultaneously, most of them ultimately based on social identity or interests. Although these cleavage dimensions exist side by side, either manifest or latent, their salience increases or declines during certain periods. Contemporary Western European democracies are characterized by two major such dimensions: the perceived economic rift, which pits workers against capital, and concerns the degree of state involvement in the economy, and the sociocultural conflicts, which revolve around issues such as immigration, law and order, abortion, among others. The relative strength of these two sources of tension influences RRP parties’ chances for successful electoral mobilization. As some of these issues lose salience, frames connected to them become less relevant to people’s interpretation of the world. As Kriesi et al. have stressed, old cleavages may provide “a shield against the framing attempts of rising collective actors.” Schattschneider makes a similar point in arguing that a “shift from the alignment AB to the alignment CD means that the old cleavage must be played down if the new conflict is to be exploited...The new conflict can become dominant only if the old one is subordinated, or obscured, or forgotten, or loses its capacity to excite the contestants, or becomes irrelevant.” As we will see below, this
has increasingly been the fate of the socioeconomic cleavage dimension in Denmark but not in Sweden.

**Denmark**

A defining characteristic of the RRP parties—in particular during the 1990s—has been their ability to mobilize working-class voters. The Danish People’s Party is no exception. In 2001, for instance, the proportion of workers among the Danish People’s Party’s voters was 56 percent (up from 49 percent in 1998), which should be compared to 43 percent of the Social Democrat voters in the same year. This is largely an effect of the decreased salience of the socio-economic cleavage dimension. As Lipset has argued, although workers traditionally have been at odds with the Left parties’ positions on sociocultural issues—they have on average been considerably more authoritarian—this does not have any practical effect on their voting patterns as long as they identify with the socialist parties’ economic positions (i.e., see them as defenders of their class interest). In such a situation, they will vote for them despite the Left’s humanitarian and liberal positions on sociocultural issues. However, as the economic dimension has lost salience at the expense of sociocultural concerns, this has started to change.

Moreover, the level of class voting (i.e. the percentage of the workers who vote according to their class interests and who are usually associated with the Left) has decreased in most western European countries, including Denmark. Between 1966 and 2001, working class support for Socialist parties in Denmark decreased dramatically, from 81 to 41 percent. The loss of working class support was particularly great among young workers. Consequently, the Social Democratic Party has lost its hegemonic position. Although the Danish Social Democracy was never as strong as the Swedish one, it peaked in 1960 with 42 percent of the votes. Since the early 1970s, however, the support for the Danish Social Democratic Party has dropped below 30 percent on several occasions—for example in the 2001 election—and during the last 30 years the non-Socialist parties have been in power as often as the Social Democrats. Moreover, the salience of socioeconomic issues has decreased, partly as a result of the politicization of alternative issues, such as immigration, security, and the European Union (EU). In 1998, for instance, only 9 percent of Danish respondents considered “economic policy” among the most important political issues of the day. “Welfare” has remained relevant, although the Social Democratic party has lost “issue ownership” over it.

As a result of these developments, the Social Democratic Party in Denmark has become increasingly ideologically and strategically disoriented. Seeing the issues the party traditionally “owned” decrease in political importance and its traditional voter constituency slowly wither away, the party has increasingly tried to exploit authoritarian attitudes on the socio-cultural dimension. However, they have failed to obtain unanimous support within the party organization (or even within the party elite) regarding the party’s line on issues such as immigration policy and the EU. Combined with economic policy gradually becoming less ideological and more attuned to “third
way” British Social Democracy, the result has been increased confusion and frustration. This weakened position has made the party unable, or unwilling, to present strong alternative or counter frames of how to define social problems in contemporary Denmark. Instead, the diagnostic and prognostic frames proposed by the Danish People’s Party have become hegemonic in the political as well as mass media discourse, at least since the mid 1990s. According to these frames, social problems should largely be interpreted in ethnic terms or as the result of moral lassitude (and not in terms of social class and economic marginalization). Moreover, they should be addressed by implementing stricter immigration policies and more law and order.

The dealignment process has also resulted in weakened bonds and loyalties between voters and the traditional, established parties: the number of “floating voters” has increased and the electoral arena has become more volatile. Without this development, there would be fewer voters available for new parties to mobilize (as issue or as protest voters), and the likelihood for new parties to escape electoral marginalization would be much reduced. In Denmark, the period of a more volatile electorate started dramatically in 1973, when the newly founded Progress Party obtained almost 16 percent of the votes in the legislative election. The Danish voters are the least politically discontented voters in Western Europe. In 1996, 84 percent of the Danish voters were “very or fairly satisfied with the way democracy worked.” Despite this fact, trust in politicians actually increased in Denmark between 1991 and 1998. Nonetheless, it is plausible to assume that the Danish People’s Party, as well, has benefited not only from the presence of “floating voters” but also to some extent from protest votes. We know that the electorate of the Danish People’s Party is characterized by relatively low trust in politicians.

Sweden

Sweden, on the other hand, has not witnessed an equally dramatic realignment process. Even though class voting has declined in Sweden, it remains fairly high, especially among the working classes. In the 1998 election 75 percent of industrial workers in the country voted for either the Social Democrats or the Left Party. The figure for other workers was 63 percent. In the 2002 and 2006 elections, the proportion declined somewhat, but 63 percent of industrial workers still voted for either the Social Democrats or the Left Party in the 2006 election.

This and the fact that union membership in Sweden is higher than in any other EU country suggest that there is still a relatively strong sense of class affinity in Sweden. In fact, the proportion of manual laborers who identified themselves with the working class was slightly higher (over 53 percent) in 1995 than it was in 1980. This indicates that “traditionally provided and sustained collective identities” have not been eroded or destroyed in Sweden to the extent that some have claimed, and that the socioeconomic cleavage dimension still dominates Swedish politics.

There is, moreover, much to suggest that the economic crisis during the 1990s boosted the relative importance of conventional issues of political
economy and the welfare state in Sweden rather than those of a sociocultural nature, such as immigration and law and order. While the economy and employment dominated the crisis years of the mid-1990s, healthcare and education have dominated the electorate’s agenda since the end of that decade. In fact, the former has emerged as a particularly critical issue since the mid-1990s, and whereas in 1995 only 15 percent of voters gave it any serious priority, by 1999 this figure was up to 41 percent. The same can be said of education, which soared from 7 percent in 1995 to 32 percent in 2002. These figures indicate the continuing salience of the socioeconomic cleavage dimension, and that realignment processes have not been much of a factor in Swedish politics (with the exception of issues concerning the environment and the EU).

As for the dealignment process, however, we do not see significant differences between Denmark and Sweden. In Sweden confidence in political institutions has declined more since the end of the 1960s than in most other European countries.\(^\text{35}\) In saying this, however, we should not forget that before the decline started, public confidence in the political establishment was, from both a national and global perspective, exceptionally high in Sweden.\(^\text{36}\) Swedish voters now have little respect for political institutions. In 2002, a mere 1 percent of those polled had full confidence in political parties, and 13 percent had fairly high confidence. Little or no confidence in political parties, on the other hand, was expressed by no less than 41 percent of the voters.\(^\text{37}\)

Despite these trends, we can also observe how voters in Sweden have become all the more pleased with how democracy in the country operates. Around the mid-1990s Swedes were no more satisfied than other Western Europeans. From the mid-1990s to 2006, the proportion of voters who claimed to be “very or fairly pleased with democracy in Sweden” increased to 81 percent, making the Swedish voters among the most contented in Europe, at least with regard to the democratic process.\(^\text{38}\) This suggests, therefore, that in recent years the niche for the mobilization of discontent has contracted.

Thus, there is and has been a considerable scope for protest mobilization for a populist party through the incitement of popular discontent with the mainstream political establishment. This situation also implies that more voters have been released from their political loyalties, and thus are available for voter mobilization in the electoral arena. That this is the case is even more obvious when we consider the declining degree of party identification. The number of voters with strong party identification has declined in Western Europe in recent decades,\(^\text{39}\) so too in Sweden, where figures dropped from 53 percent in 1960, to 34 percent in 1982 and 24 percent in 1991, reaching 15 percent in 2006.\(^\text{40}\)
Issue voting has gained in importance in Western Europe in the past decades. As a result issue competition has become even more important than before. Following Budge and Farlie, we may assume that parties try to benefit from issue-voting not so much from opposing each other’s issue positions as from trying to shift public (and media) attention from one issue to another. Hence, agenda setting, politicization, and framing play a crucial role for modern parties.

Denmark
As discussed above, issues belonging to the socioeconomic dimension have lost salience in Danish politics, in particular since the mid-1990s. Part of the reason for this was the politicization of the immigration issue. Although xenophobic attitudes were widespread in Denmark during the 1970s as well, immigration did not become a politicized, salient issue until the mid-1980s, when these feelings were given an articulated form by the Progress Party and related actors. The anti-immigration rhetoric turned out to be highly resonant, because it coincided with a dramatic increase in the number of asylum-seekers, and with the changing character of Danish immigration, from labor market immigration to (non-European) refugee immigration. Denmark was among the EU countries with the smallest immigrant population growing from less than 4 percent in the late 1980s to just about 7 percent in 2001, half of these immigrants having arrived from non-European countries. However, the number of asylum-seekers increased from 800 in 1983 to 4,300 in 1984 to 8,700 in 1985. Hence, these years were propitious for politicizing the immigration issue. The Danish media picked up the issue immediately, and content analysis shows that the press and state television presented immigration to Denmark mainly as a problem. The ethno-nationalist/ethno-pluralist framing of the immigration issue also had a great impact at the voter level: in 1985, 23 percent of voters agreed with the statement “immigration is a serious threat against our distinctive national character.” By 1987 the percentage had doubled to 47 percent. Yet, it was not until the 1990s that the issue of immigration became the dominant topic in newspapers, and indeed in political discourse and the public debate. The Danish People’s Party as well as the Danish Association, a far-right circle of intellectuals, played a key role in this process. When celebrating its tenth anniversary in 1997, the chairman of the Danish Association concluded that the goal to bring the immigration issue “into the public and political debate as a crucial problem of Danish society” had been attained. The way of achieving this had been to collect
and present information for political actors, and by producing numerous letters to the editor and chronicles to the press. Søren Krarup, for instance, one of the founding fathers of the Danish Association and later a MP for the Danish People's Party, has been interviewed frequently in the media, and has authored about 200 feature articles in the tabloid *Ekstrabladet*, which is one of Denmark's most read newspapers. The Danish People's Party was also given substantial media coverage on immigration issues: many articles and TV news segments dealing with immigration included statements and comments from representatives of the Danish People's Party. As a consequence, after the minister responsible for immigration, the party leader Pia Kjærsgaard was the person most quoted on immigration matters during the second half of the election year of 2001. The reason why the immigration issue came to dominate Danish political and mass media discourse since the mid-1990s has also to do with the fact that some of the established parties joined the discourse. This, also, had the effect of revealing to the voters the indirect influence and power of the Danish People's Party, as well as lending legitimacy to the thus far marginalized party. The Liberal Party, for instance, campaigned against the immigration policy of the incumbent Social Democratic government in the period between 1997 and 2001. In 1998 the Liberals made big announcements on refugee policy in several major Danish newspapers. According to Bjørklund and Goul Andersen, these announcements went unusually far for an established party. The Social Democratic Party, for their part, became increasingly divided over the issue of immigration during the 1990s. Originally a defender of refugee immigration and (some sort of) multiculturalism, the party drifted toward a more unsympathetic view of these matters as the Danish People's Party gained ground in opinion polls—to large extent at the expense of the Social Democrats—and as the party was attacked by not only the Danish People's Party but also the Liberal Party for being too generous on immigration. The Social Democratic government responded with “both symbolic and real tightening of refugee and immigration policies.” For instance, in 1997, the Social Democratic Minister of Interior, Birte Weiss, was replaced by Torkild Simonsen, who had made a reputation of being hard against immigrants and a critic of the government’s refugee policy. The Social Democratic government responded with “both symbolic and real tightening of refugee and immigration policies.”

Many of the immigrant women are wrongly fed, because their men want to show their wealth and fortune by keeping their women big and fat. When I see immigrants driving around in big cars, it pops into my mind that they have not earned their money in a way I can accept...They are highly criminal; they drive around in big cars, wear too expensive clothes, and their fat wives give birth to lots of kids.

Although this event provoked a discussion over expelling Camre from the Social Democratic party, this did not happen. The probable reason was,
aside from the opposition from several leading Social Democratic mayors to such a decision, the risk of losing voters that shared Camre’s opinions on immigrants. However, when Camre left the Social Democrats for the Danish People’s Party in 1999, the effect was increased legitimacy not only for the ideas he expressed but also for the Danish People’s Party.55

As a result of the dominating position of the immigration issue in Danish political and mass media discourse, the salience of the issue for voters’ decisions has increased dramatically. In 2001, 20 percent of the voters mentioned “immigration” when asked which problems of the day they considered to be most important for politicians to address. In 1990, it was only 4 percent. Furthermore, in 1987 only 4 percent mentioned immigration when asked about the most important issue affecting their vote. By 1998 immigration had increased to 25 percent, making it the single most important issue.56

At the same time, the proportion of voters sharing xenophobic or anti-immigration attitudes was still at a high level. In 1998, 42 percent of the voters agreed with the statement “immigration is a serious threat against our unique national character/national identity.” 57 Similarly, 43 percent agreed with the statement “in the longer run, the Muslim countries are a serious threat against Denmark’s security,” and 50 percent agreed with the statement “refugees that have been given residence permit here in Denmark should be sent home as soon as possible.”58

As a result, there emerged a niche of voters susceptible to the xenophobic and ethno-nationalist message of the Danish People’s Party. The Party has tried hard to exploit this niche by using frames and strategies adopted from the French Front National (via the mediation of the Danish Association). There is no doubt that the Danish People’s Party had a sharp enough profile to take advantage of the available opportunities: the party was given –97 by the voters on an index ranging from –100 (most hostile to immigration) to +100 (most open to immigration).59 We also know that the voters of the Danish People’s Party are exceptionally hostile to immigration. For example, in 1998 75 percent of them believed that immigrants were a serious threat against the unique Danish national identity.60

Sweden

Sweden has long been a country of net immigration, in that more people have migrated in than migrated out. Non-European immigration increased in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Today 11 percent of the Swedish population consists of people born abroad. Moreover, during the 1990s, the average number of asylum applications was twenty-nine for every 1,000 Swedish citizens, as opposed to eighteen in Belgium, sixteen in Austria, five in France and one in Italy.61 Thus, as Kitschelt has shown, immigration per se cannot serve as an explanation for why RRP parties have become successful in some countries but failed in others.62

Moreover, a majority of Swedish voters in the 1990s were in favor of reducing the number of asylum-seekers. Such attitudes peaked at 65 percent in 1992, falling steadily thereafter for the remainder of the decade. In 2007
45 percent of voters were in favor of reducing the number of refugees. Data from the International Social Survey Program also shows that in 1995 Swedish voters were roughly just as opposed to immigrants and immigration as those in the rest of Western Europe. They were also more inclined than the average European to agree with the statement “immigration causes crime” and just as likely to agree with the statement “immigrants contribute nothing to the economy.” A survey carried out by the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia in Vienna shows that things had changed little by 2000.

The perceived importance of the immigration issue increased in the 1980s and 1990s in most Western European countries. This trend peaked in Sweden in 1993, when 25 percent of the voters ranked immigration among the top three most urgent issues facing the country. The political salience of immigration then declined for the remainder of the decade, and after an election campaign heavily focused on citizenship and immigration, it increased again in 2002 to become the fourth most important political issue (19 percent). This was the highest ranking it achieved since the heyday of New Democracy in 1993. However, this upward trend did not continue through the 2006 election.

Still, the very existence of xenophobic attitudes does not automatically lead to the growth of an RRP party. Nor is it sufficient for the immigration issue to be considered important and prominent; it must also be seen as a politically important issue. This means that it must first be politicized, or “translated” into political terms. Although an issue is politicized to a certain extent when seen as important by both politicians and voters alike, it is only really fully politicized when it affects their political behavior. By this definition, the immigration issue was not yet fully politicized in Sweden during the 1990s. It has not proved especially important for the Swedish electorate in terms of choice of party, possibly with the exception of 1991, when New Democracy had its electoral breakthrough. These results corroborate Osendarp’s argument that to date the xenophobic cleavage dimension in Sweden has not significantly affected voters’ political decisions.

We have thus found that Sweden has about as many xenophobic and immigration-skeptic voters per capita as other Western European countries. Almost 50 percent of the voters favor taking in fewer asylum-seekers into the country, and a relatively large proportion of voters give high priority to the issue of asylum and immigration. As Demker has shown, the proportion of voters holding anti-immigrant sentiments was higher (60 percent) among those who ranked refugee and immigration issues among the top three social problems. This means that a relatively high proportion of the voters want a tighter immigration and asylum policy and consider
this issue more important than most other issues. It is among such voters that the RRP parties can hope to mobilize support, leaving us to conclude that there is a relatively large niche for a Swedish anti-immigration party, such as a RRP party, to take root. At the same time, however, immigration has not been such an important and salient political issue, in the sense that it affects people’s voting behavior, as it has been in the countries where RRP parties have enjoyed a measure of success, and this has helped to curb such developments. In Sweden, since the 1994 election, immigration has more or less disappeared from the list of issues affecting voter choice, with the exception of the 2002 election. We must, however, be careful in determining causality here, as there are indications that such issues only become fully prioritized after a RRP party has become established.71

Conclusions

This paper has shown that in the past two decades Denmark and Sweden shared several important opportunity structures, in particular related to anti-immigrant sentiments among the electorates and feelings of disenchantment toward the political institutions. Yet, the two countries have diverged in some important ways. First, while the socioeconomic cleavage dimension had lost much of its importance in Danish politics, it was still highly salient in Swedish politics. Secondly, the issue of immigration has been much more politicized in Denmark than in Sweden where the socioeconomic dimension still dominates the agenda. Finally, although the Danish People’s Party and the Sweden Democrats share the same ideological core, and have used very similar rhetoric, the Sweden Democrats have been much more stigmatized as a result of their origin in and connections to the fascist movement. The party has thus found it very difficult to create a respectable façade. The Danish People’s Party, on the other hand, originated from the Progress Party and has never met such severe stigmatization. This is shown in the mainstream parties’ and the media’s relation to the party.

The intrusion of a new political actor into a party system is likely to have consequences on the dynamics within this system. It may have consequences for agenda setting, by making certain political issues more salient and others less so; it may influence the way political actors talk about certain issues (framing); and it may make mainstream parties change positions in order to win back votes or to prevent future losses (accommodation). When holding strategic positions in the parliament, new actors may of course also come to influence policies more directly. In this paper, I did not study such effects systematically—it must be saved for a separate paper—but based on the evidence presented, I feel confident arguing that the emergence and
electoral breakthrough of the Danish People’s Party has had consequences on the Danish party system and legislation in all the ways described above. As indicated before, the immigration issue has established itself as the dominant question on the political agenda. There has been an increasing consensus around the ways immigration and immigrants are framed (as problems and as threats to Danish values), and several of the mainstream parties have moved toward a stricter view on immigration policy. Because it is a support party to the minority government, the Danish People’s Party has also had considerable direct influence on immigration policies. In Sweden the RRP parties have been either too short-lived (New Democracy) or too marginal (Sweden Democrats) to have comparable consequences on the Swedish party system or legislation.72

Notes


Moreover, data from the 1998 election show that issues such as “immigration” and “law and order” are typical lost-issues for the Social Democrats. Considerably fewer than what actually voted for the party believed that the Social Democratic Party was the best party to handle these issues. J. Goul Andersen, “Hvad Kan Partierne: Partierens Kompetence-Image,” in *Vælgere Med Omtanke—an Analyse af Folketingsvalget 1998*, ed. Johannes Andersen, Ole Borre, Jørgen Goul Andersen, and Hans Jørgen Nielsen (Århus: Systime, 1999), 145.


See G. Andersen, “Dansk Folkeparti och nya Konfliktdimensioner i Dansk Politik.”


Bernhard Ebbinghaus, and Jelle Visser, “A Comparative Profile,” in *The Societies of Europe: Trade Unions in Western Europe since 1945*, ed. B. Ebbinghaus and J. Visser (London: Macmillan,


33 See Oscarsson and Holmberg, *Regeringsskifte*.


38 Karpantschof, *Populism and Right Wing Extremism in Denmark*, 38.

39 Ibid., 43.

40 Bjørklund and Andersen “Anti-Immigration Parties”, 128.


42 Bjørklund & Andersen “Anti-Immigration Parties in Denmark and Norway,” 110. When asked to select from a list the issues that were of greatest importance for their choice how to vote, as many as 60 percent marked ‘refugee and immigration policy’ in 1998 — and 68 percent marked “law and order,” another of the Danish People’s Party’s pet issues. Jorgen Goul Andersen, “Hvad Står Partierne for: Partiernes Policy-Image,” in *Vælgere med omtanke—*


58 Ibid.


62 Kitschelt, The Radical Right in Western Europe, 62.


67 Dahlström and Esaiasson, “The Immigration Issue and Radical Right Party Success.”


